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Abstract: We evaluate the success of Brazil’s Corregedoria-Geral da União’s (CGU) anti-
corruption program in fostering better outcomes in the health sector using panel data from 
5560 Brazilian municipalities over the period from 2000 to 2011. Since 2003, the program 
has randomly selected municipalities to be investigated each year, and immediately disclosed 
its findings. We examine two mechanisms through which this program could matter: a 
deterrent effect whereby municipalities react to the threat of being audited, and an auditing 
effect, whereby municipalities change behavior only when actually audited. A regression 
discontinuity approach on four outcomes likely to react quickly to corruption changes finds 
no improvement due to the deterrent or auditing effect, while difference-in-difference models 
suggest statistically significant but a small short-run effect of actually being audited on the 
infant mortality rate. Our results point to very weak effects of the anticorruption audit 
program on the health indicators studied, and corroborate the general view that the legal 
system is slow to identify, prosecute and punish criminal activities. 	
	
JEL classification: H51, H72, I18, O17	
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Evaluating the impact of Brazil’s central anti-corruption program on municipal 
provision of health services 	
	
	
1. Introduction	
While previous studies have explored whether anti-corruption programs detect or 
change corruption, save money, or change spending, this paper addresses the more 
fundamental issue of whether anti-corruption audits are successful in their goal of improving 
the quantity or quality of government-funded services, the ultimate outcomes of public 
interest. We focus here on outcomes affected by health care spending, which are often a large 
component of federal budgets, and have been a particular focus of corruption audits in many 
countries. Data from Brazil’s innovative federal anti-corruption program is particularly 
informative because this program emphasized randomization and immediate information 
provision, providing unforeseen and rapid potential impacts. Did Brazil’s anti-corruption 
program measurably improve health outcomes? 
The core feature of Brazil’s central anti-corruption program, which started in 2003, is 
that a randomly chosen subset of moderately large municipalities was audited each year, and 
the results quickly publicized, even before any criminal or civil charges were made. Since 
these audits were truly random (even done with replacement) the quasi-experimental design 
enables us to compare outcomes between audited and unaudited municipalities to see if there 
is a direct “auditing effect.” Moreover, because we have data from before the anti-corruption 
program started, and can also take advantage of the fact that large municipalities were not 
eligible to be audited, we also use difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity 
methods to examine changes health outcomes before and after the program started, and 
between eligible and ineligible municipalities to see if there is evidence any “deterrent 
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effect”: outcome changes made in anticipation of the threat of a possible audit. The variation 
in when audits occur also enables us to examine the timing and persistence of changes in 
outcomes, whether due to audits or the threat of audits: do the effects persist? 	
Brazil’s Corregedoria-Geral da União (CGU), the Comptroller General’s anti-
corruption agency, has a mandate to monitor municipalities’ usage of funds provided by the 
central government. As described in Ferraz and Finan (2008), the CGU program investigates 
and monitors central fund in numerous areas, including education, health, and infrastructure. 
Thehealth sector is the second largest single recipient of centralized funds, largely though the 
Brazilian Public Health System (SUS). The SUS was created by Brazil’s 1988 Constitution, 
which defined a process of decentralization, first for primary health and prevention services 
and then for other services (Oates, 1999). Although the central government was successful in 
largely decentralized the administration of the health sector - mainly by means of the 
Program of Health Family (PSF) according to Rocha and Soares (2010) - decentralization of 
the financing has happened more slowly.1 This is troubling because corruption with remote 
sources of funds may be easier than with locally-generated funds. In 2011 the central 
government still financed about 40% of the provision of health services, hence if corruption 
diverts resources away from the health sector, its impact could be large. Another reason for 
studying health care outcomes is because several such outcomes plausibly respond quickly to 
the presence of new funds. We focus here on the infant mortality rate, rate of undernourished 
children, number of child care appointments per inhabitant and percentage of children up to 
age 1 who are vaccinated, all of which can respond within one year to improved funding. 
																																								 																				
1	 In 2000, a Constitution amendment initiated financial decentralization. Amendment 29 made municipal 
authorities solely responsible for spending 15% of their total budget on health. Although initially targets differed 
by municipality, by 2005 all municipalities were required to adhere to the same target.  Full implementation of 
the amendment was implemented in 2011. 	
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The CGU program is attractive to study because it relies heavily on randomization to 
promote fairness: a public lottery drawing every year since 2003 determines which 
municipalities are selected for an audit. The municipalities eligible for this lottery are those 
with less than 500 000 inhabitants, which represent 99% of all Brazilian municipalities. 
Figure 1 illustrates the randomness of the audited municipalities from 2003 to 2011. 	
	
     Figure 1 – Municipalities that were audited at from 2003 to 2011	
	
	
Health sector financial transfers in particular have been the target of investigations by 
the CGU anti-corruption program. Careaga and Weingast (2000), Rodden (2000), and 
Persson and Tabellini (2000) argue that attempts to reduce corruption through 
decentralization cannot be effective until funding no longer comes from the central 
government. Since corrupt municipality leaders have little incentive to do audits, the CGU 
5	
	
monitoring program was specifically designed to prevent misuse of central government 
funds.   	
The second reason for studying the CGU program concerns Brazil’s new emphasis on 
transparency and public disclosure of information. The CGU audit reports are available on 
the Internet shortly after the municipalities have been audited. Publicizing any irregularities 
discovered through the inspections reduces information asymmetry and improves economic 
efficiency by exposing questionable transactions conducted in municipalities; and doing so 
quickly reduces the prospect of political influence suppressing any findings. The CGU anti-
corruption program was launched in response to public outcries over growing corruption and 
the lack of transparency.2 	
Building on the existing theories, this study aims to assess the effect of the CGU anti-
corruption program on improving health standards, measured by four health performance 
indicators, through increased expenditure. This task was carried out using annual data from 
2000 to 2011. We use Brazil’s 5,560 Municipalities as our unit of analysis, which are similar 
to American counties but include both cities and rural areas. The results of the paper 
potentially shed light on the feasibility of this kind of anti-corruption program in other 
countries, especially when reforms are done in the context of financial decentralization and 
significant corruption.   	
One rationale for questioning the effectiveness of the CGU anti-corruption program is 
the widespread skeptici. The legal system is often seen as slow to identify, prosecute and 
punish criminal activities. Even if a crime is detected the justice system can be very slow to 
bring suspected criminals to trial. Additionally, court proceedings seem to fail at successfully 
punishing defendants or compensating victims. A final concern is that even if corruption is 
																																								 																				
2	Brazil only became a signatory to the Freedom of Information Act (FOI) in 2011.	
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identified and punished, it may not meaningfully improve public good provision if the 
punishment is largely invisible to voters and other potential offenders. Bac (2001) and Costa 
(2012) even suggest that by publicizing which officials are amenable to accepting bribes or 
publicizing the extent of the problem, the anti-corruption program may even worsen 
corruption.  	
We distinguish and test for two possible impacts of the CGU anti-corruption program. 
One possibility is that the mere threat of being discovered has a deterrent effect, promoting 
better governance of resources and allocation. If deterrence is the mechanism for 
improvement, then reductions in corruption and improved performance should have occurred 
immediately after the program was started in 2003, and will be independent of whether a 
municipality is actually audited or not. Municipalities not at risk of an audit should not 
display any effect of the CGU program. A second possibility is that improvement only occurs 
when an audit is made and results are publicized or punished. With this punishment process, 
benefits of the CGU program arise only in areas that are actually audited. 	
Another motivation for this study is to better understand the persistence of effects to 
identify, publicize and punish corruption over time. Even if actual audits or their threat does 
improve health care outcomes, it matters whether this improved performance persists 
indefinitely, or lasts for only one or a few years. This is particularly important given Brazil’s 
recent decline in the number of municipalities actually audited under the CGU program. As 
shown in Figure 2, during the first three years, from 2003 to 2005 there was a 5-7% chance 
that a municipality would be audited in each year, but by 2011 this rate had declined to only 
1.9%3. Penalties for corrupt practices remained unchanged over the same period, so the 
																																								 																				
3  Information about the CGU Program, in Portuguese, can be found at 
http://www.cgu.gov.br/controleinterno/AvaliacaoExecucaoProgramasGoverno/Sorteios/Municipios/Sorteados/in
dex.asp. The website describes the program evaluation, implementation, and design, the lottery data, and all 
available reports from the investigations.     	
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reduced probability of detection was not offset by increased penalties. This trend weakens the 
CGU program and makes enforcement capabilities questionable. Running an experiment, 
Azfar and Nelson Jr. (2007) find a positive relationship between the ease of detecting 
corruption and the corruption incidence. 	
	
	
	
Figure 2 – Proportion of Brazilian municipalities audited per year, 2003-2011	
	
	
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the 
existing literature, and describe the chronology of interventions and changes in the Brazilian 
health sector. Section 3 specifies our hypotheses, describes our panel data and outlines our 
empirical strategy. Section 4 presents our results, while Section 5 discusses our main 
conclusions. 	
 
2. Literature 	
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There is an enormous interest in whether decentralization can reduce corruption, together 
with interest in how corruption affects various social indicators, including the performance of 
the health sector. The classic paper by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) uses a model of inter-
jurisdictional competition to illustrate the possibility of a negative relationship between 
decentralization and corruption. Their results rely upon the logic of market competition: there 
is less corruption when local governments compete to attract residents and this consumer 
choice deters public officials from providing services inefficiently. 	
Despite the theoretical possibility of this result the empirical evidence for it is mixed. 
Fredriksson and Vollebergh (2009) use data from OECD countries and find indirect evidence 
that federal systems tend to have less corruption than other types of political systems. 
Decentralization under a federal system reduces corruption by increasing the number of 
levels of political officials necessary to bribe in order to obtain large scale benefits. Fisman 
and Gatti (2002) found that greater decentralization was linked to lower levels of corruption 
behavior using cross-country data as well. Contrary views are offered by Careaga and 
Weingast (2000), Rodden (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000), and more recently Fan, 
Lin and Treisman (2009), who warn that decentralization may not be successful in reducing 
corruption if decentralized spending by municipalities is not accompanied by decentralized 
revenue. 	
Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) argue that when government transfers resources to 
address a market failure, this increases incentives for municipalities to indulge in corrupt 
behavior: a federal structure requires local bureaucrats to gather information and implement 
federal policies, creating opportunities for local officials to misreport or misrepresent their 
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findings for their own self-interest. Using data from the United States, Goel and Nelson 
(2011) find a negative effect of decentralization on local government corruption activities. 	
A different line of argument is that anti-corruption programs are inherently 
ineffective. Banerjee, Mullainathan and Hanna (2012) argue that there are no guarantees that 
the bureaucrat responsible for auditing the municipalities’ is not himself corrupt. This can 
occur if the bureaucrat benefits from the existing information asymmetry in the 
municipalities, or will accept bribes in exchange for ignoring mismanagement. 	
Several studies examine corruption specifically in Brazil. Peixoto et al. (2012) find 
that the number of corruption incidents in Brazil’s Southeast region between 2004 and 2010 
declined when municipalities gained control over the provision of basic health services. 
Ferraz and Finan (2008) find that an increase in the number of corruption charges identified 
by the CGU program reduced the probability of an incumbent being reelected in the 
municipal election results. Hence local officials may not want to identify corruption, even if 
only higher level bureaucrats are involved, since they may be blamed. Ferraz, Finan and 
Moreira (2012) analyze whether the reduction in allocated funds due to corruption and 
misuse affects students outcomes in Brazil. They find that missing resources significantly 
constrains school quality. Test scores on national standardized exams and exam pass rates are 
significantly lower in more corrupt than less corrupt municipalities, while dropout rates are 
significantly higher. 
Lichand, Lopes and Medeiros (2015) analyzed the association between the number of 
corruption cases discovered by Brazil’s CGU anti-corruption program and health and non-
health spending outcomes. Consistent with our findings, they find that health outcomes were 
largely unaffected or if anything became worse after detection of corruption. According to the 
authors, “Preliminary evidence suggests that, after the program, procurement staff hold 
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spending back because they are afraid of accidentally misreporting procurement: the decrease 
in corruption can therefore be entirely attributed to lower expenditure for a given set of 
transfers.” The Lichand et al. study uses much of the same data and is closest to the current 
study. Both Ferraz et al. and Lichand et al. focus on the effects of corruption, not on the 
effects of an audit or an audit program. Corruption might negatively affect education and 
health outcomes even if the CGU audits themselves have little or no impact on levels of 
corruption. And alternatively the audit program may influence corruption (through a deterrent 
effect) even among municipalities that are not audited (and hence where corruption is not 
detected.) In this paper we do not examine whether detected corruption causes worse 
outcomes, but rather we examine directly whether the CGU government audit program - 
which entails both actual audits and the threat of audits - affects health outcomes regardless 
of whether corruption is detected, publicized, prosecuted, or punished. 	
	
3. Material and methods	
	
3.1. Hypotheses	
The CGU anti-corruption program can be thought of as changing the price of 
corruption. The price effect arises because the program, by increasing the likelihood of a 
municipality being audited, caught and punished for irregularities, increases the cost of 
corruption for the municipality leaders. Building on Careaga and Weingast (2000), we 
conceptualize politicians as maximizing their utility U by allocating a fixed budget between 
public goods, y, and corruption, r, where the total budget available depends on the 
municipalities total revenue, which depends on transfers coming from the central 
government, T, and revenue from its own resources, !. Hence:  	
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 	 max!,! ! !, !   s.t. ! + !" ≤ ! + !.                       (3.1)	
	
In equilibrium the relative cost of y in terms of r, is captured by !, the relative price of 
y, which may be affected by anti-corruption efforts. The public official’s marginal rate of 
substitution between public goods and corruption will reflect the relative price of the two 
goods, which can depend on the anti-corruption program effect. The anti-corruption program 
lowers the price of y by decreasing !. 	
The relative price of corruption can change through two mechanisms. One mechanism 
is that municipalities change this price due to the threat of being audited and corruption 
detected, which we call the deterrent effect. A different mechanism is that officials only 
change their behavior after they are audited and corruption is detected, which we call the 
auditing effect. This auditing effect could occur either because the corrupt officials are 
removed from office or because new policies and procedures are implemented which make 
corruption more difficult (Myers, 1983). Myers studies whether the degree of certainty of 
punishment deters both first-time criminal activity and subsequent crimes, which is called 
recidivism. He finds that both first time crime and recidivism go down as the certainty of 
punishment increases, suggesting that both deterrent and auditing effects are meaningful. In 
our context the deterrent effect should be declining over time, since the probability of 
detection is declining over time, as seen in Figure 2. We formalize two possibilities as two 
hypotheses.	
Hypothesis 1 (Deterrent Effect): The anti-corruption program deterred corruption in 
on all municipalities eligible for audits. More resources were available and outcomes should 
improve in all municipalities at risk of an audit.	
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Hypothesis 2 (Auditing Effect): The anti-corruption program only affected 
municipalities once they are audited, such as by removing the corrupt officials. Only when a 
municipality is audited and mismanagement is found are more resources available and 
outcomes should improve in the next period. 	
The null hypothesis is that the anti-corruption program has no effect on municipality 
performance measures. 
	
3.2. Data	
We use annual municipality data between 2000 and 2011,  extracted primarily from a 
survey (DATASUS) conducted by the Brazilian Health Ministry. This survey provides 
information on health indicators and information about financial and management 
decentralization. We use annual municipality averages of the following four health indicators 
as dependent variables: infant mortality rate, rate of undernourished children, number of child 
care appointments per inhabitant and percentage of children up to age 1 who are vaccinated. 
Further details about the data sources and uses are provided in an Appendix A.1.  
 
3.3. Econometric Method 
 To test our assumptions we use sharp discontinuity regression design as our main tool 
to identify the effect of the program on health indicators. We also use difference-in-
differences models and robustness tests. Since the first three of our outcomes are highly 
skewed, with a few high outliers, we used the log of these three rates as our dependent 
variable in our graphs and regressions, while childhood vaccination rates were left in levels. 
4. Results and Discussions	
4.1. Graphical Results 
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Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of the selected health indicators respectively 
between eligible and non-eligible municipalities and between audited and non-audited 
municipalities. These illustrations also reveal a considerable improving trend in all four 
measures throughout the sample period, which includes three years before the CGU program. 
By themselves, the figures do not identify or estimate the magnitude neither of the deterrent 
nor the auditing effect, but they do suggest that the effect, if any is small.  
 
	
	
Figure 3 – The evolution of the selected health indicators between eligible and non-eligible 
municipalities 	
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Figure 4 – The evolution of the selected health indicators between audited and non-audited 
municipalities (excluding the large, never-eligible ones)	
	
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate common trends of the selected health indicators among 
subgroups of municipalities; both between eligible and ineligible municipalities (a proxy for 
municipality size) and before and after the program was implemented, where we split 
between audited and never-audited municipalities among those eligible for an audit. The 
trends are the very similar, although one can see a hint of improvement in Figure 4 for infant 
mortality and numbers of children vaccinated between the audited and unaudited groups over 
time. 		
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4.2. Preliminary regression results	
 To separately distinguish deterrent and auditing effects, we use a difference-in-
difference estimation approach. Our approach takes advantage of the fact that very large 
municipalities, those with a population over 500 000, were exempt from being audited under 
this program. Hence the underlying trend in the four performance measures in the absence of 
both deterrent and auditing effects is reflected by this subsample.  
 The CGU program was announced in the same year of its implementation and the first 
draws of municipalities in 2003 were considered as a pre-test for it eventual investigation. In 
that pretest period, only municipalities under 300 000 inhabitants were included in the lottery. 
At the beginning of 2004 the program was extended to all municipalities with less than 500 
000 inhabitants. Although as researchers we know about this change in the threshold ex post, 
it is unlikely that any municipality was aware of this boundary change at the time of the 
lottery.  Therefore, for this study we use the final, definitive cutoff of municipalities of 500 
000 or more as our cut point, although we later test whether the results are robust to the 
change in the cutoff for 2003.     	
The deterrent effect is identified by a differences in the trend rate of performance by 
the municipalities eligible versus not eligible to be audited, while the auditing effect is 
identified by the change in performance for those municipalities who are actually audited 
versus not audited. Control variables are included to control for observable differences across 
municipalities, which is particularly relevant since our natural control municipalities are 
larger, and hence inherently different, from the smaller municipalities eligible for the CGU 
program4. 	
																																								 																				
4	 Almost all of the state capitals are big municipalities, for instance while state capitals are rare in the smaller 
municipalities. 	
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 We estimate three panel fixed effect models (4.1) to (4.3), which differ in whether 
they estimate deterrent effects only, auditing effects only, or both effects.5	
	!!" = !!!"                + !!"!!+ !! + !! + !!!"      (4.1) !!" =           + !"!" + !!"!! + !! + !! + !!!"        (4.2) !!" = !!!" + !"!" + !!"!! + !! + !! + !!!"          (4.3) 
 
where yit is a health indicator as previously described;   	!it =1 if population ≤ 500 000 inhabitants, 0 otherwise, which reflects the eligible set of 
municipalities for CGU program after 2002;	
Ait  =1 once a municipality has ever been audited (including the audit year), 0 otherwise;         	
X is a matrix of control variables;  α! are municipal fixed effects;	λ! are yearly time fixed effects;	
e#it are three idiosyncratic error terms;	
and the other Greek symbols are coefficients (scalars or arrays) to be estimated.	
 	
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the estimates from equations (4.1) to (4.3), respectively, for each 
of our four dependent variables. Although the different specifications capture the program 
effects - using just a dummy for eligibility, or for being audited, or both - the R2 for each 
specification remains almost the same in all models.  These small changes in the R2 statistics 
suggest that our policy variables explain a very small proportion of the total variation across 
municipalities, but our large sample gives us the power to identify statistically significant 
effects for some outcomes nonetheless.  
	
Table 1 - Fixed effect model results for infant mortality and rate of undernourished 
children 
VARIABLES Ln(Infant mortality rate per 1,000)                   (Mean = 2.907; SD = 0.598) 
Ln(Rate of undernourished children age < 1 
per 10,000)  (Mean =	5.097; SD=1.180	) 
	
 Deterrent 
only   (5.1) 
Auditing only   
(5.2) 
 Both effects 
(5.3) 
 Deterrent 
only   (5.1) 
Auditing only   
(5.2) 
 Both effects 
(5.3) 
Eligible 
municipality  
-0.005  -0.0001 -0.285   -0.282 
(0.023)  (0.022) (0.253)   (0.275) 
	
         
Ever audited  -0.023** -0.023*   -0.017 -0.017 
																																								 																				
5  Ferraz and Finan (2008) describe 450 thousand of inhabitants as being the cutoff for CGU inspection, but the 
actual cutoff is the municipalities with less than 500 thousand inhabitants as can checked in Portuguese at 
www.cgu.gov.br. According to these authors, no previous announcement about the CGU policy was released 
prior to the year of its implementation, and the selection for audits was truly random with replacement.	
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municipality  
 (0.011) (0.012)   (0.017) (0.020) 
	    
      
Observations 48,174 48,174 48,174 47,893 47,893 47,893 
R-squared 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.474 0.474 0.474 
Number of 
municipalities 5,390 5,390 5,390 5,255 5,255 5,255 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses.	
Other control variables included are year dummies, municipal population, GDP per capita, health expenditure per inhabitant, 
public school expenditure per inhabitant, the Family Health Program (PSF) coverage, number of beds per 10 thousand 
inhabitants, private health insurance, percentage of health expenditure coming from central government, and percentage of 
enrolled students at elementary and medium school older than the expected age for each grade. 	
	
	
Table 2 - Fixed effect model results for number of childcare and vaccinated children 
VARIABLES Ln(Number of childcare appointment per inhabitant)     (Mean = 0.096; SD=0.106) 
Vaccinated children under 1 year old       
(Mean = 0.939; SD=0.089) 
	
 Deterrent 
only   (5.1) 
Auditing only   
(5.2) 
 Both effects 
(5.3) 
 Deterrent 
only   (5.1) 
Auditing only   
(5.2) 
 Both effects 
(5.3) 
Eligible 
municipality  
0.002  0.002 0.089***   0.089*** 
(0.018)  (0.017) (0.025)   (0.024) 
	
         
Ever audited 
municipality  
 -0.001 -0.001   0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002)   (0.002) (0.002) 
	    
      
Observations 51,697 51,697 51,697 55,567 55,567 55,567 
R-squared 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.332 0.331 0.332 
Number of 
municipalities 5,275 5,275 5,275 5,307 5,307 5,307 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses.	
 Other control variables included are year dummies, municipal population, GDP per capita, health expenditure per 
inhabitant, public school expenditure per inhabitant, the Family Health Program (PSF) coverage, number of beds per 10 
thousand inhabitants, private health insurance, percentage of health expenditure coming from central government, and 
percentage of enrolled students at elementary and medium school older than the expected age for each grade. 	
  	
We find statistically significant but small effects of the CGU program for two of our 
four dependent variables. In our models of infant mortality rate, the estimated coefficient for 
the audited effect is significant and negative values in two specifications, suggesting that the 
auditing program lowered infant mortality via auditing effect. For vaccinated children under 
1 year old., we find that the deterrent effect of the CGU program is statistically significant 
and positive, while actually being audited had no significant effect. We fail to find any 
statistically significant effect on undernourished children age < 1 and number of childcare 
appointment per inhabitant.	
18	
	
 This simple difference-in-difference (DD) specification treats all municipalities as if 
they are the same size, so that treatment effects are the same for any size municipality. Even 
though we included municipality and time fixed effects, there is still a potential for 
misleading results if there is any relationship between municipality size and the effectiveness 
of the CGU program on our performance measures. In addition, as we did not include 
controls for the levels of the health indicators between subgroups, these are confounded with 
the deterrent effect. To explore this possibility, we now use a regression discontinuity (RD) 
design that allows us to better control for possible differences between our eligible and non-
eligible municipalities for the CGU program, as detailed in the next section.  We also explore 
other dimensions of treatment effects for this program by examining lag effects for the 
audited municipalities. In this case we use the traditional DD model, applied only to 
potentially audited municipalities.   	
	
4.3 Regression Discontinuity Design  
 Using the sharp cutoff for eligibility to the CGU audits based on municipal population 
of 500 000, we look at municipalities just below and just above that threshold.  For detecting 
the deterrent effect of Hypothesis 1, we use sharp discontinuity design regression on the 
selected health indicator and we use municipal population equal to 500 000 inhabitants as a 
cut point. In this case the eligible municipalities, populated with less than 500 000 
inhabitants, is the treated group, and the most populated municipalities, non-eligible for the 
CGU program, is the control group. For testing for the auditing effect of Hypothesis 2, we 
estimate a DD model using the audited municipalities as the treated group and the non-
audited but eligible municipalities as the control group. For this analysis, larger 
municipalities do not provide a useful comparison group since they are never audited. We 
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also assess the significance of the observed results by conducting a policy placebo 
experiment, which randomly selects 1000 new municipality samples among eligible 
municipalities. Mimicking the design of the original/true program lottery, we estimate 1000 
DD models for one of the health indicators, and use the empirical distribution of the 
estimated treatment effect to calculate statistical significance if there were no treatment 
effect. We then compare the observed estimate to this distribution to see how likely it would 
be under the null hypothesis of no treatment effect.    	
	
4.3.1. Testing the anti-corruption program’s deterrent effect	
 Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we estimate a Sharp Regression 
Discontinuity (SRD) design model to assess if the announcement and implementation of the 
CGU program has any deterrent effect on the selected primary health indicators, Yit. 
However, as these estimates include both the effect of being actually audited (the audited 
municipalities are a subsample of the eligible municipalities) and the deterrent effect of being 
potentially audited. As all the municipalities less than 500 000 inhabitants are subject to 
audit, the municipal population is our assignment variable, Xit, and our cutoff point is this 
municipal population value6. Taking the logarithm of this variable, the cutoff point becomes 
13.12.  We estimate the non-parametric local linear and local polynomial equation (5.4) for 
each health indicator after 2003 when the CGU program was announced and implemented. 	
 According to the regression discontinuity design method, we use only data near the 
cutoff or give more weight for the observations close to it as a way to compare the program 
effects only in similar unities. In the SRD design the cutoff point defines the treated and the 
																																								 																				
6 See the next section for further discussion of a different cutoff in 2003. 
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non-treated groups. Thus we overcome the identification problem, pointed out by the 
preliminary estimates, using the triangular kernel in SRD estimates. 	
 In the Sharp Regression Design (SRD) the discontinuity in the conditional expectation 
of the outcome on the covariates, including the assignment variable, means an average causal 
effect of the treatment. Thus the effect can be described by equation (5.4), where c is the 
cutoff point, Yit is the outcome, the health indicators, Xit is the forcing variable (or treatment-
determining), the municipal population in this case.	
 !!"# = lim!↓! ! ! ! = ! − lim!↑! ! ! ! = !            (4.4)	
 
4.3.2. Regression Discontinuity Design Results	
 Figure 5 shows the population histogram and its adjusted kernel density for all years 
and municipalities as well the CGU program’s cutoff point. The municipal population 
variable is continuous at the cutoff point for investigation and the majority of municipalities 
are eligible to be audited; as we already mentioned, 99% of the smallest Brazilian 
municipalities in population are eligible to be audited by the CGU program	
	
	
	
Figure 5 – Municipal Population histogram and kernel density	
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 Figures 6-9 show the scatterplots of the health indicators for the years 2003-2011 
against the municipal population and its cutoff region. We also include a fourth-degree 
polynomial-adjusted curve for each side of the cutoff. In the left side of each Figure, green 
dots are the health indicator values of non-audited municipalities and black dots represent 
these values for the audited municipalities. These plots reveal meaningful nonlinearities in 
our performance measures, and hence simple diff in diff estimators that compare group 
means will be biased. The polynomial curves on both sides of the cutoff fail to detect 
meaningful discontinuities in the childcare appointments and the vaccinated children 
indicators.   
 
	
	
Figure 6 – Infant Mortality Rate and municipal population at the cutoff	
Scatterplot adjusted by a different polynomial curve in each side of the cutoff (50 thousand observations)	
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Figure 7 – Undernourished children and municipal population at cutoff	
Scatterplot adjusted by a different polynomial curve in each side of the cutoff (50 thousand observations)	
	
	
Figure 8 – Childcare appointments and municipal population at cutoff	
Scatterplot adjusted by a different polynomial curve in each side of the cutoff (50 thousand observations)	
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Figure 9 – Vaccinated children under 1 year old and municipal population at cutoff	
Scatterplot adjusted by a different polynomial curve in each side of the cutoff (50 thousand 
observations)	
	
 Analysis of the scatterplots of alternative demographic variables, presented in 
Appendix A.2, fail to find any with significant discontinuities at the 500 000 cutoff. 	
 Table 3 provides non-parametric discontinuous estimates of the combined effect of 
both a deterrent effect and the audit effect for different subsets of years and-cutoff using the 
triangular kernel for bandwidths of 50%, 100% and 200%, respectively.  Our results are very 
close to zero, but also very sensitive (including changes of sign) to the bandwidth and to the 
intervals of years. To check for whether there was any transitory effect in 2003 when the 
program was implemented we estimate RD including and excluding 2003 when the initial 
cutoff was 300 000 instead of 500 000, but fail to find any meaningful change. We also 
estimate the RD between 2003 and 2005 when the probability of a municipality being 
investigated was higher. The results are unstable, changing signs, and show some statistically 
significant but empirically small effects. Overall, despite our large sample size, we are unable 
to detect that the CGU program had any meaningful effect on our four outcomes.  
Table 3 – Non-parametric triangular kernel estimates – Bandwidth of 50%/100%/200% 
lwald 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate  
Rate of 
Undernourished 
children, age 
<1 
Number of 
Child Care 
Appointments 
per Inhabitant 
Percentage of 
Vaccinated 
children, age 
<1 
Estimates 2003-2011 
    Bandwidth 50 -0.068 -0.034 0.038** -0.013 
 
(0.049) (0.165) (0.016) (0.009) 
Bandwidth 100 -0.033 0.135 0.023* -0.009 
 
(0.028) (0.104) (0.012) (0.006) 
Bandwidth 200 -0.041** 0.044 0.002 -0.014*** 
 
(0.021) (0.088) (0.008) (0.005) 
Observations 40,096 40,297 45,966 47,851 
Estimates 2004-2011 
    Bandwidth 50 -0.040 -0.029 0.043** -0.012 
 
(0.051) (0.169) (0.020) (0.009) 
Bandwidth 100 -0.006 0.092 0.042*** -0.004 
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(0.036) (0.119) (0.011) (0.006) 
Bandwidth 200 0.017 0.049 0.018* -0.0002 
 
(0.027) (0.096) (0.010) (0.005) 
Observations 35,440 35,551 41,258 37,440 
 
Estimates 2003  
    Bandwidth 50 -0.281* -0.021 0.007 -0.029 
 
(0.149) (0.295) (0.017) (0.026) 
Bandwidth 100 -0.151 0.0525 0.008 -0.054*** 
 
(0.107) (0.188) (0.008) (0.020) 
Bandwidth 200 -0.160* -0.063 -0.003 -0.014 
 
(0.0819) (0.223) (0.006) (0.017) 
Observations 4,656 4,746 4,708 5,170 
Estimates 2003 using cutoff of 300 
thousand 
    Bandwidth 50 -0.041 -0.198 -0.034** 0.063** 
 
(0.075) (0.253) (0.015) (0.028) 
Bandwidth 100 -0.066 -0.150 -0.024** 0.054** 
 
(0.058) (0.173) (0.010) (0.022) 
Bandwidth 200 0.035 -0.083 -0.022*** 0.028** 
 
(0.051) (0.139) (0.007) (0.013) 
Observations 4,656 4,746 4,708 5,170 
Estimates 2003-2005 
    Bandwidth 50 -0.084 0.171 0.014 -0.031*** 
 
(0.058) (0.148) (0.009) (0.011) 
Bandwidth 100 -0.164* 0.188 0.012 -0.020 
 
(0.090) (0.202) (0.013) (0.014) 
Bandwidth 200 -0.056 -0.019 0.002 -0.004 
 
(0.045) (0.143) (0.009) (0.009) 
Observations 13,852 14,097 14,621 15,687 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; the first three variables were estimated in logs; standard errors in parentheses; tests on 
explanatory variables do not find a significant jump at the cutoff. 	
	
 Table A2 in the appendix shows further RD estimates by year and in this case the 
results are even less significant. These results confirm the graphics results suggesting no 
deterrent effect7 of the program on the health indicators, and no notable differences in results 
across years, even as the number of municipalities audited changed meaningfully. As a 
specification check, we also estimated RD models for each exogenous variable to show that 
there are no discontinuities at the cutoff point of eligible versus non-eligible municipalities by 
																																								 																				
7  It also includes the auditing effect since the audited municipalities are a subset of the eligible municipalities.  
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population. In addition, Table A3 shows the robust estimates of RD according to the 
polynomial order of the point estimator.  
 Our preliminary regressions suggested a positive deterrent effect on Vaccinated 
children, age <1, but the RD results indicate the opposite. In the first case, however, we got a 
significant result because of the confound information of the deterrent effect (the 
announcement of the program) and the difference between the levels (or average) of the 
indicators between the eligible and non-eligible municipalities.  
4.4.  Extended Difference-in-Differences	
To assess whether the audit affects the health only when municipalities are actually 
audited, the auditing effect of Hypothesis 2, we use an expanded version of the difference-in-
differences (DD) model equations (4.1-3). Instead of using a single dummy for whether a 
municipality if ever audited, we utilize the audited municipalities as the treated group and the 
non-audited eligible or not eligible as non-treated groups. In addition we split the non-audited 
municipalities into two control groups, the ones eligible for the program (with less than 500 
000 inhabitants, but not audited) and the ones not eligible (with more than 500 000 
inhabitants). 	
We estimate DD model described by equation (4.5). We are concerned about different 
time interventions for each municipality and more than one control group. Since we have two 
control groups and 9 time periods of intervention - every year around 200 municipalities are 
randomly selected to be audited - we use DD estimates for multiple periods and control 
groups as proposed by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). We also include municipal fixed 
effect to control for the unobserved municipal characteristics. 	
!!"# = !! + !!!" + !!"#!!"# + !! + !! + !!" + !!"#                        (4.5)	
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where yigt is the health indicator value of municipality i, group g, and in year t, 	
αi is the municipal fixed effect,	!! is a full set of time or  year dummies,	!! is a full set of group effects or dummies for the three groups; the audited municipalities, the 
eligible but not audited,  and the non eligible (large) municipalities.	
pgt is group/time period covariates, (these are the policy variables), a dummy program variable with 
value 1 after the municipality was audited, and 0 otherwise,   	
xit = matrix of control variables, observed characteristics of the municipalities, 	!!"   is time and group unobserved effect,	!!"# is the individual-specific error.	
 
Bertrand, Dufle and Mullainathan (2004), discuss some problems associated with 
evaluations of policies and programs on economic variables. According to these authors, 
econometricians tend to accept the effects of the policies more than they should, based on the 
difference-in-differences model’s estimates because of endogenous variables. Therefore, we 
conduct a sensitivity analysis for the DD models’ statistically significant estimates of the 
program on the health indicators. Because we have a quasi-experimental exogenous variable, 
we only need check one dimension of the policy variable for robustness. At the same time, 
this analysis also can be seen as checking whether the CGU program is truly random.   	
We estimate equation (4.5) 1000 times using the 1000 simulated random placebo 
program variables instead of the original CGU drawn program variable, pit, for the 
statistically significant models. The idea is that if we could find seemingly significant effects 
even when the program has no real effect on health indicators, then a lottery of new samples 
of municipalities should result in more null rejections for the placebo program than our 
significance statistics level, 5%.	
 Table 4 shows DD model estimates for the health indicators according to equation 
(4.5). Results suggest that the program has an auditing effect only on the infant mortality rate, 
and we find no significant CGU program effect on the remaining health indicators. 	
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Table 4 – DD models (A-1)	
VARIABLES	 Infant Mortality	
Rate of 
undernourished 
children under 
1 year old	
Number of 
childcare 
appointment 
per inhabitant 	
Vaccinated 
children under 
1 year old	
	 	 	 	 	
pg	 -0.024**	 -0.014	 -0.001	 -0.00002	
	 (0.012)	 (0.020)	 (0.002)	 (0.002)	
	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 47,767	 47,638	 51,301	 55,181	
R-squared	 0.045	 0.473	 0.116	 0.332	
Number of 
municipalities	 5,360	 5,225	 5,245	 5,277	
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses; the first three variables were estimated in logs. Year 
dummies and control variables included (municipal population, GDP per capita, health expenditure per inhabitant, public 
school expenditure per inhabitant, the Family Health Program (PSF) coverage, number of beds for 10 thousand inhabitants, 
private health insurance, percentage of health expenditure coming from central government, and percentage of enrolled 
students at elementary and medium school older than the expected age for each grade). 	
 	
 As we find a 5% significant effect of the CGU program on the infant mortality rate, 
we conducted a sensibility analysis for this health indicator. We randomly drew 1000 samples 
of “selected municipality” that mimic the real CGU lottery and estimate difference-in-
differences regressions replicating equation (4.5) 1000 times. We replicate it replacing the 
policy variable, pit, by the program placebo that was randomly chosen. We also replace the 
treated group, and the non-treated but eligible group, according to each random draw 
conducted. This sensitivity analysis (results not shown here) suggests no effects under the 
“placebo policies”. By using placebo policy on the infant mortality rate, we obtained a 
normal distribution of pit’s coefficient with mean zero. This result is the expected one for 
placebo policies, and strengthens the positive effect of the CGU program audit on the infant 
mortality rate.	
 To evaluate the duration of the auditing effect on the infant mortality rate through the 
time we estimate equation (4.5) replacing the policy variable, ptg, with dummies for different 
years of elapsed time since the year of the audit. The first columns assumes the audit only 
affects outcomes in the year of intervention, the second only outcomes in the one year after 
the intervention, and so on. The results show significant effects only at the year of the 
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auditing, Table 5. Thus, the effect of auditing on infant mortality rate is effective at very short 
run, disappearing after only one year.	
	
Table 5 – DD models – Effects 	
 	
year of 
auditing	 1 year after	 2 years after	 3 years after	 4 years after	 5 years after	
VARIABLES	
Infant 
mortality rate	
Infant 
mortality rate	
Infant 
mortality rate	
Infant 
mortality rate	
Infant 
mortality rate	
Infant 
mortality rate	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Modified ptg	 -0.0337**	 -4.56e-05	 -0.00599	 0.0162	 0.00603	 -0.0140	
	 (0.0154)	 (0.0155)	 (0.0155)	 (0.0170)	 (0.0174)	 (0.0191)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Observations	 48,217	 48,217	 48,217	 48,217	 48,217	 48,217	
R-squared	 0.046	 0.046	 0.046	 0.046	 0.046	 0.046	
Number of 
municipalities	 5,391	 5,391	 5,391	 5,391	 5,391	 5,391	
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses, the dependent variable is logged. Year dummies  
and control variables included (municipal population, GDP per capita, health expenditure per inhabitant, public school 
expenditure per inhabitant, the Family Health Program (PSF) coverage, number of beds for 10 thousand inhabitants, private 
health insurance, percentage of health expenditure coming from central government, and percentage of enrolled students at 
elementary and medium school older than the expected age for each grade).  
 	
	
5. Conclusions	
Brazil’s anti-corruption program, which used strict randomization and emphasized 
speedy publication of findings, provides a unique opportunity to study the effect of a well 
designed anti-corruption program on four important health indicators. Previous studies have 
examined whether the program detected, prosecuted or punished corruption (e.g., Finan and 
Ferraz, 2011) or studied whether municipalities with corruption had worse health outcomes 
(Lichand et al. (2015). Our study examines the policy-relevant question of whether the CGU 
anti-corruption program actually improved any of four health indicators, which is not 
necessarily implied by either of the previous sets of studies. 	
We do not find strong evidence that the randomized audit program had any 
meaningful effect on our four health outcomes, although we do find evidence of a tiny one 
year, but statistically significant effect of audits on infant mortality. This is not inconsistent 
with the existing literature on transparency, and in particular Freedom of Information  (FOI) 
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legislation, which finds mixed evidence on their effectiveness.  Escaleras, Lin and Register 
(2010), examine panel data on 128 countries that includes 46 countries adhered to FOI in 
2003 as a way of promoting greater transparency in the public sector and did not discover any 
significant effect of developed countries incorporating FOI on the level of corruption. More 
controversially, the authors find a perverse effect of transparency on corruption for 
developing countries. 	
Our mostly null findings are robust to a number of alternative specifications. Our 
placebo test for robustness, conducted by taking random draws that mimic the true CGU 
lottery and conducting difference-in-differences analysis, fails to find a similar effect 
suggesting that our results are not due to nonlinearities or other uncontrolled for correlations.  
Moreover, we find that the beneficial effects of an audit are short-lived, with no evidence that 
benefits continue after the year of the random audit. Alternative regression discontinuity 
results of the deterrent effect - as well as of the audit effect, since the audited municipalities 
are a subsample of the eligible municipalities - are not robust for different bandwidth and 
time observed. 	
Since the Brazil’s health system decentralization is typical of the developing 
countries, where there is a gap between financial and management decentralization, 
knowledge about the value of attempts to curb corruption and improve the quality of health 
outputs are potentially valuable to other countries. Because the CGU program is very 
expensive, our poor results for the health sector indicate that other approaches will be 
necessary to improve results. Note that our study only examines health outcomes; other 
studies suggest that the program may have been effective at changing reelection results and 
improving education outcomes. 	
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Our results do not help us understand whether the poor performance improving health 
outcomes comes from problems with the implementation of the anti-corruption program or 
from other institutional problems. One example of an implementation problem is the way the 
reports of corruption are disclosed. Dissemination of results is done via a 200-page document 
that describes the irregularities found in the audited municipality, according to the type of 
health program, without a common methodological pattern. It could be that more 
standardized and simpler reporting methods would have a greater impact. In addition, the 
number of municipalities audited by year decreased significantly in the end of our sample, 
reducing the relative cost of corruption.   
Institutional issues may also underlie the poor performance of the anti-corruption 
auditing program. Others have pointed to the failure of the Brazilian justice system to punish 
crimes efficiently because of its very slow pace. The instability of Brazilian public 
institutions is another challenge. Improving the justice system and public administration will 
take more effort than financial audits. 	
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Appendix A.1	
Table A-1 – Variables description and sources   	
Variable description and Source 	 Obs	 Mean	 Std. Dev	 Min	 Max	
Health indicators	
Logarithm of infant mortality rate under 1 year 
per 10,000 children (DATASUS)	 50794	 2.907	 0.595	 0.243	 6.908	
Logarithm of undernourished children under 1 
year per 10,000 children (DATASUS)	 53741	 5.106	 1.189	 0.137	 7.597	
Logarithm of the number of appointment of 
children health care per inhabitant (DATASUS)	 57531	 0.100	 0.106	 2.0E-06	 0.989	
Rate of vaccinated children under 1 year 
(DATASUS)	 62151	 0.939	 0.089	 0.013	 1.000	
Policy variables	
Dummy for year of audit (CGU)	 67104	 0.028	 0.164	 0.000	 1.000	
Dummy =1 for each year after an audit (CGU)	 67104	 0.154	 0.361	 0.000	 1.000	
Forcing variable	
Logarithm of population - DATASUS	 66695	 9.376	 1.146	 6.534	 16.223	
Control variables	
Logarithm of GDP (in thousand of Reais) per 
capita (prices of 2000) – IBGE	 66695	 1.628	 0.596	 0.495	 5.297	
Logarithm of municipal health expenditure per 
inhabitant (prices of 2000) – DATASUS	 65796	 4.834	 0.536	 0.087	 7.109	
Logarithm of municipal health expenditure per 
inhabitant (prices of 2000) financed by own 
municipalities resources (DATASUS)	
65793	 4.742	 0.836	 0.000	 7.679	
Logarithm of school public expenditure per 
inhabitant (prices of 2000) (IPEA)	 63039	 5.230	 0.481	 0.017	 10.80	
Percentage of population covered by PSF/ESF 
(DATASUS)	 65432	 65.30	 40.052	 0.000	 100.0	
Logarithm of number of bed per 10 thousand 
inhabitant (DATASUS)	 66736	 2.109	 1.569	 0.000	 6.282	
Percentage of population covered by health 
insurance (ANS)	 64758	 0.061	 0.116	 4.0E-05	 8.595	
Percentage of central transfers (from SUS) out of 
total health expenditure of municipality 
(DATASUS)	
66756	 37.99	 18.451	 0.000	 100.0	
Percentage of enrolled students at elementary 
school older than the expected age for each grade 
(INEP)	
66531	 30.18	 17.488	 0.000	 88.80	
Percentage of enrolled students at high school 
order than the expected age for each grade 
(INEP)	
66432	 43.27	 23.408	 0.000	 100.0	
ANS – National Regulatory Agency for Private Health Insurance and Plans. www.ans.gov.br	
CGU – Corregedoria Geral da União’s (CGU) anti-corruption program. http://www.cgu.gov.br	
DATASUS – Health Informatics Department of the Brazilian Ministry of Health.  www.datasus.gov.br	
IBGE – Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics. www.ibge.gov.br	
INEP – National Institute for Educational Studies and Research "Anísio Teixeira". www.inep.gov.br	
IPEA – Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research. www.ipeadata.gov.br	
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Appendix A.2.  
 
 Figure 1A uses the data in Figures 5 through nine, but collapses the data by taking 
averages for clusters of 250 municipality-years observations across the size spectrum to 
create a scatterplot of conditional means of the health indicators for different values of the 
municipal population on which the regression discontinuity is defined. Each dot in the figure 
plots the mean for 250 different municipality-years. We also plot a local linear smooth line to 
the average values of the health indicators, which was calculated by optimization criteria 
using a quadratic fit based on least square method.  Separate lines are fit to the left and right 
sides of the cutoff. The very different pattern of the health indicators across the number of 
inhabitants suggests that results are sensitive to the assumed functional form. Different types 
of adjustment lines can lead to different results and conclusions. It seems that there is distinct 
heteroskedasticity for larger size municipalities, which is difficult to explain.	
 	
	
	
Figure 1A – Interpolation of the mean of health indicator values conditional on population split at 
cutoff  (all municipalities from 2003 to 2011, 50 thousand observations).	
     Scatterplot adjusted by a polynomial curve in both sides of the cutoff (50 thousand observations)	
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Appendix A.3. Further model specifications 
Discontinuity Regression Design	
Robust estimates from SRD using a local polynomial model and optimized bandwidth 
are shown in Table A-2. We follow Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) to calculate 
bandwidth. In this case we also find estimates very sensitive to the polynomial order. 
Changes on the significance of estimates are evident according to higher flexibility in the 
models, estimated with higher degree polynomial on both sides of the cutoff. 	
In sum, using a regression discontinuity design that allows the deterrent effect to vary 
more flexibly with municipality size, we find no evidence that the eligible municipalities had 
improved their health conditions.  
 
Table A-2 – RD – Estimates by year  
	
Lwald 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
2003 2004 2005 
Bandwith 50 -0.281* -0.0205 0.007 -0.029 -0.183 0.031 0.0126 -0.0146 0.0207 0.453 0.031 -0.009 
 
(0.149) (0.295) (0.017) (0.026) (0.122) (0.343) (0.025) (0.0186) (0.125) (0.307) (0.024) (0.015) 
Bandwith 100 -0.161 0.032 0.0038  -0.046** -0.097 0.031 0.010 -0.025 0.032 0.258 0.029 0.007 
 
(0.104) (0.228) (0.012) (0.022) (0.082) (0.247) (0.017) (0.0158) (0.086) (0.220) (0.019) (0.013) 
Bandwith 200 -0.135 -0.065 -0.002 -0.015 -0.086 -0.036 -0.007 0.002 0.061 0.127 0.016 0.002 
 
(0.084) (0.230) (0.010) (0.019) (0.065) (0.239) (0.018) (0.0151) (0.069) (0.22) (0.015) (0.011) 
Observations 4,656 4,746 4,708 5,170 4,631 4,679 4,871 5,241 4,565 4,672 5,042 5,276 
               2006 2007 2008 
Bandwith 50 0.108 0.580** 0.002 -0.013 -0.054 0.244 0.031* 0.009 0.002 0.151 0.057 -0.015 
 
(0.132) (0.258) (0.024) (0.015) (0.123) (0.359) (0.0175) (0.0218) (0.086) (0.331) (0.050) (0.011) 
Bandwith 100 0.115 0.244 0.012 -0.004 0.016 0.101 0.035** 0.005 0.014 0.156 0.046 -0.012 
 
(0.097) (0.221) (0.016) (0.010) (0.085) (0.247) (0.018) (0.014) (0.066) (0.253) (0.034) (0.008) 
Bandwith 200 0.180** 0.250 -0.004 -0.003 0.024 0.171 0.016 0.009 0.144*** 0.206 0.016 0.003 
 
(0.076) (0.186) (0.013) (0.009) (0.067) (0.202) (0.017) (0.008) (0.056) (0.198) (0.026) (0.008) 
Observations 4,519 4,635 5,168 5,333 4,439 4,470 5,195 5,345 4,422 4,396 5,221 5,368 
             
  2009 2010 2011 
Bandwith 50 -0.032 0.025 0.103 -0.003 0.001 -0.151 0.032* 0.002 0.049 0.117 0.029 0.005 
 
(0.087) (0.339) (0.079) (0.019) (0.088) (0.359) (0.018) (0.019) (0.085) (0.364) (0.021) (0.021) 
Bandwith 100 0.014 0.026 0.043 -0.010 0.023 -0.082 0.026* -0.001 0.031 0.156 0.026 0.005 
 
(0.065) (0.261) (0.055) (0.011) (0.064) (0.248) (0.014) (0.011) (0.063) (0.244) (0.017) (0.013) 
Bandwith 200 0.156*** -0.043 0.040 -0.004 0.270*** 0.087 0.012 0.006 0.199*** 0.341* 0.021 0.023 
 
(0.052) (0.205) (0.043) (0.007) (0.054) (0.202) (0.012) (0.009) (0.053) (0.195) (0.013) (0.017) 
Observations 4,331 4,369 5,233 5,368 4,261 4,187 5,238 5,355 4,272 4,143 5,290 5,395 
(1) ln(Infant Mortality Rate); (2) ln(Rate of undernourished children under 1 year old); (3) ln(Number of childcare 
appointment per inhabitant); (4) Vaccinated children under 1 year old 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A-3 – Robust non-parametric local polynomial regression with triangular kernel 
estimates 
  
Infant 
Mortality 
Rate 
Rate of 
Undernourished 
children, age 
<1 
Number of 
Child Care 
Appointments 
per Inhabitant 
Percentage 
of 
Vaccinated 
children, age 
<1 
  Order of local polynomial = 1 
Robust (0.0512) (0.182) (0.0191) (0.00807) 
 
-0.0718 -0.0908 0.0378* -0.0116 
Observations 722 586 554 405 
 
Order of local polynomial = 2 
Robust (0.00807) (0.243) (0.0233) (0.00919) 
 
-0.0116 -0.155 0.0367 -0.00828 
Observations 405 760 826 735 
 
Order of local polynomial = 3 
Robust -0.0330 -0.167 0.0451* -0.0183 
 
(0.0851) (0.318) (0.0251) (0.0118) 
Observations 979 1,013 1,609 824 
 
Order of local polynomial = 4 
Robust -0.0528 -0.300 0.0388 -0.0269** 
 
(0.0924) (0.385) (0.0282) (0.0132) 
Observations 1,325 1,037 1,701 982 
 
Order of local polynomial = 5 
Robust -0.0783 -0.188 0.0406 -0.0249* 
 
(0.0952) (0.382) (0.0300) (0.0140) 
Observations 1,730 1,615 2,024 1,277 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses; first three variables are use logs.	
	
 
 
